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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper proposes an evolutionary approach for inspection
planning which introduces various reliability engineering tools into
the process and assess system trade-offs among reliability,
engineering requirement, manufacturing capability and inspection cost
to establish an optimal inspection plan. The examples presented in
the paper illustrate some advantages and benefits of the new
approach. Through the analysis, reliability and engineering impacts
due to manufacturing process capability and inspection uncertainty
are clearly understood; the most cost effective and efficient
inspection plan can be established and associated risks are well
controlled; some inspection reductions and relaxations are well
justified; and design feedbacks and changes may be initiated from the
analysis conclusion to further enhance reliability and reduce cost.
The approach is particularly promising as global competitions and
customer quality improvement expectations are rapidly increasing.
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1.INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, people establish an inspection plan on a product
unit according to blue print requirements. Quality planning
engineers assess the criticality of the inspection features, largely
dependent upon their experience and "best guess, judgment call", then
flow down the inspection requirements including the inspection items
and levels to inspectors. Generally in the practice, components or
system reliability and concerned failure modes were not extensively
analyzed, and inspection cost and feasibility were not emphasized and
manufacturing process capability was not considered during the
inspection planning process. Consequently, much of the inspection
effort and cost might have been wasted on insignificant inspection
features or on in-efficient and in-effective inspections. On the
other hand, some critical features may not receive proper attention,
and possibly escape the inspection, resulting in a jeopardized
reliability. It is also often seen that the communications between
quality planning engineering and design engineering are very weak.
Even when they communicate, quantitative data from one organization
is not necessarily utilized by the other.
To be cost-effective and to achieve a high reliability, we must
develop an alternative approach. Some analytical tools must be
utilized and system engineering approaches adopted to overcome the
weakness and the drawbacks of the traditional inspection planning
methodology. This paper illustrates how various reliability
engineering tools and statistical methods can be utilized which not
only helps to realize cost and reliability objectives but promotes
concurrent engineering as well.
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2.TRADITIONAL INSPECTION PLANNING METHODOLOGY
Products are generally complex, especially from the defense and
aerospace industry. Manufacturing processes and steps of making them
are divided among many different departments. It is observed that
many inspections are performed by inspectors who don't have a
complete understanding of the product's function, the impact of the
inspection feature on product reliability, and fitness for use.
Customer requirement on traceability and necessary standardization of
inspection process also require development of a formal inspection
planning document. Usually, this task is accomplished by a quality
planning engineer with the resultant inspection planning document
flowed to inspectors for guidelines and instructional use.
During the past several years, the Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) program developed a formal classification of characteristics
("c of c") process to support inspection planning. The "c of c"
utilizes Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Item
List (GIL) as a baseline to assign one of three levels of
classifications (critical, primary and major) to an inspection
feature. PMEA/CIL describes the component functions, failure
scenario and design retention rational, assesses in details design
life, fracture mechanics, material properties, factors of safety, and
evaluates the consequence of non-conformance. Based upon the
FMEA/CIL, the "c of c" allows a quality planning engineer to include
essential design information and all reliability concerns into the
inspection planning document. All reliability-sensitive
characteristics are identified, significant inspection requirements
are established, and effective allocation of inspection resource and
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effort are facilitated.
Though the "c of c" work has significantly employed failure mode
analysis information, the process still lacks quantitative analysis
to determine inspection levels and inspection sample size. The
traditional sampling inspection standards, such as MIL-STD-105
(Sampling Procedures and Tables For Inspection by Attributes) and
MIL-STD-414 (Sampling Procedures and Tables For Inspection by
Variables) presented Acceptable Quality Level (AQL) concept as well
as consumer's risk and producer's risk, but in reality, these
statistics were hardly correlated to the end product reliability in
decision making. Product design parameter profiles and engineering
data base were seldom quantitatively utilized by quality planning
engineers. The manufacturing capability and quality level were
generally not considered in the inspection planning. All these facts
motivate us to develop a systematic, analytical approach for
inspection planning, which utilizes and integrates all information
and data from engineering analysis, failure mode analysis,
manufacturing capability study and inspection uncertainties to
establish an optimal inspection plan.
3.PROPOSED EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
Reliability engineering and statistical methods provide essential
tools to evolve the current inspection planning practice to a more
systematic and analytical approach. FMEA/CIL analysis has enumerated
failure modes and failure consequences. The fault tree analysis is
utilized to clearly define the failure path of a component
non-conformance. Statistical process control and manufacturing
process capability studies provide data on the inspection feature
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quality level and manufacturing stability. An inspection sampling
plan characterizes itself in terms of probability of acceptance
relative to an incoming lot quality. Probabilistic analysis modeling
of a system or a sub-system allows us to connect all data and
information together and integrate them into a system model.
Computer simulations will then be employed to assess the trade-offs
and sensitivities quantitatively for different input including
engineering and reliability requirements, manufacturing capabilities
and sampling inspection plans. An optimal inspection plan can be
selected from the simulation result, according to the specific
engineering and reliability requirement, manufacturing capability and
inspection trade-offs and cost considerations.
Flow Chart 1 illustrates the proposed approach. Flow Chart 2
describes the detailed steps of the approach.
Flow Chart 1
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Flow Chart 2
INSPECTION PLANNING FLOW CHART
RELIABILITY AND COST DRIVEN APPROACH
ENGINEERING AND
RELIABILITY
REQUIREMENTS
ENGINEERING ANALYSIS
OR FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
MANUFACTURING
FMEA
INSPECTION
FEATURES
FAILURE HISTORY
(LESSONS LEARNED)
MANUFACTURING
CAPABILITY DATA
J
SYSTEM OR COMPONENT
REQUIREMENT DEFINITION
(REL.COST ETC.)
TRADE OFF ANALYSIS
(COMPUTER MODEL
OR OTHERS)
INSPECTION PLAN
ESTABLISHMENT
MONITORING
PLAN
4.ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
Example 1: Tube wall thickness sampling inspection plan development
There are 1080 tubes in a particular component of SSME. The
drawing tolerance for the tube wall thickness of a specific location
is .0065"+.0027"/'0000. The tubes are manufactured by a supplier of
the company. This example tries to answer the following questions:
During the acceptance of the product, do we need to perform 100%
inspection to check the wall thickness ? If we do sampling
inspection, what is the proper sample size to guarantee reliability ?
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Through the FMEA/CIL study, it is determined that tube leaking is
the failure mode of concern. The leakage causes loss of SSME fuel,
resulting in off-nominal engine operating condition. The worst case
from multiple tube ruptures and leakages will drive turbine discharge
temperature to exceed engine redline limit, therefore, prematurely
shutting down the engine.
If tube walls are too thin, they will cause tubes failure during
proof pressure test or during engine hot fire test. If tube walls
are too thick, they may result in restricted coolant flow, which will
accelerate degradation of the walls and eventually cause tubes to
crack and leak. For simplicity and illustrative purpose, we are just
studying thinner wall effect and the corresponding inspection
strategy and scheme in this example.
Engineering Structural Analysis
Assume p(t) is the structural failure probability curve as
function of wall thickness t. The f(t) is wall thickness
distribution density function. We compare the following two cases:
CASE1 CASE 2
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Since the overlapping area under the p(t) curve and the f(t) curve
for the case 2 is much bigger than for the case 1, it is obvious that
the inspection for the case 2 should be much more stringent than the
inspection for the case 1 in order to screen out the tubes which may
potentially cause failure.
The structural failure probability curve p(t) is roughly
estimated to be
p(t) = exp( -1523 * t ) , t > 0
Manufacturing Capability Assessment
It has been determined that the tube wall thickness is normally
distributed. But due to manufacturing lot-to-lot variation, both
mean m and standard deviation s of the distribution are random
variables. From data, it is estimated that m is roughly subject to
an uniform distribution which is bounded by .0070" and .0086" and s
is roughly subject to another uniform distribution which is bounded
by .0005" and .0010".
Reliability Requirement
We require the failure probability of any incoming lot of tubes
installed on engine after passing inspection, be less than .00005
with 95% confidence level.
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Computer Simulation Model
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The Simulation Result
Input into the simulation model:
p(t) = exp( - 1523 * t );
f(t) = normal distribution with mean m and standard
deviation s, where
m is a random variable with Uniform (.0070, .0086) and
s is a random variable with Uniform (.0005, .0010)
Sampling plan: MIL-STD-414 Single specification limit, normal
inspection sampling plan with sample size 5.
Output: the Graph 1 shows the simulation result, which indicates
the simulated confidence levels as function of different acceptable
quality levels representing different sampling plans. The result
tells us for this particular application, the sampling plan with AQL
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15% is good enough to meet the reliability requirement.
Graph 1
Wall Thickness Inspection
Result from the Computer Simulation Model
Input information: choose the single specification limit, normal inspection
sampling plan, code letter "D" (sample size 5) from MIL-STD-414 Table B-1.
Manufacturing capability: m ~ UnHorm(.0070, .0086); s - Uniform(.0005, .0010).
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Sensitivity Study
Now we assume a manufacturing process of another vendor is worse
than the previous one. The wall thickness distribution has more
variability. The standard deviation s of the density f(t) is subject
to a wider Uniform distribution:
s is Uniform (.0007, .0013) instead of Uniform (.0005, 0010).
We run the simulation again. It is seen from the comparison graph,
Graph 2, for the worse manufacturing process, we have to apply a more
stringent sampling plan which has AQL 1% in order to screen out the
bad parts and protect reliability.
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Graph 2
Tube Wall Thickness Inspection
Comparison Results for Different Manufacturing Capabilities
Input information: choose the single specification limit, normal inspection
sampling plan, code letter "D" (sample size 5) from MIL-STD-414 Table B-1.
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Example 2; Fuel sleeve hole diameter inspection
There are 120 sleeve elements in an SSME component. Every
element has 168 sleeve holes on it which allow engine fuel to flow
through and mix uniformly with liquid oxygen to form hot gas. The
sleeve elements are supplied by a vendor who manufactures the sleeve
holes using electro-discharge machining process. The drawing
tolerance for hole is .018"+.002/-.000. In the past the vendor was
requested to 100% inspect the hole diameters. But the inspection
process was lengthy and costly. In this example, we study the impact
of sleeve hole diameters on engine performance and investigate the
possibility of reducing inspection without jeopardizing reliability,.
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
There are two failure modes associated with the hole dimension
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non-conformance. The first one is non-uniformity of the hot gas flow
which may cause local off-nominal mixture of fuel with oxygen and
result in local component erosion. Because of the design nature, the
local erosion, if occurring, is self-limiting. The second failure
mode is reduced or increased fuel flow resulted from undersized or
oversized hole diameters. The consequence of this failure mode is to
generate an engine system off-nominal condition, which may
potentially cause engine sub-system temperatures to exceed redline
limit, therefore prematurely shutting down the engine.
Engineering Aerothermo-dynamics Analysis
Aerothermo-dynamics engineering analysis was performed to assess
the impact and sensitivity of different hole diameters on engine flow
balancing. The corresponding engine sub-system flow rates and
temperature changes for the different hole diameters are calculated
and summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Aerothermo Property of Different Hole Sizes
(Drawing tolerance .'018" + .002/-.000)
I All Sleeve Holes] Sub-system 1 | Sub-system 2| Sub-system 3
| Sized to | Temp. Delta | Temp. Delta | Flow Rate Delta
.014
.016
.018
.020
.022
.024
.026
'
-34R
-15R
0
+13R
+23R
+32R
+39R
+52R
+22R
0
-17R
-31R
-42R
-SIR
.11 Ibs/sec.
.05
0
-.04
-.07
-.10
-.13
i i
AR&MS 94RM-014 page 12
Manufacturing Process Capability Assessment
The sleeves are manufactured utilizing the electro-discharge
machining process. The vendor uses 7 electrodes to fabricate holes
on each of 7 rows respectively. Each electrode is used 12 times and
then cut and trimmed to a new wire electrode portion to account for
the tool wear. After studying the vendor's manufacturing process, it
was determined that the process is stable and capable of meeting the
drawing requirement. A set of sleeve hole data was collected and
plotted in Graph 3.
Graph 3
Fuel Sleeve Hole Manufacturing Capability
(Drawing Tolerance .0018"+.002/.000)
;;s^.«:woio8i'
'CpK ' = '2.00 '''
.0186762 .020(USL)
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Reliability and System Performance Requirement
We require that the sub-system 1 temperature change be less than
+/-6.5R, the sub-system 2 temperature change be less than +/-8.5R and
the sub-system 3 flow rate change within +/-.02 Ib/second. These
requirements provide enough safety margin to prevent engine operation
condition from exceeding redline limits.
Computer Simulation Model
Taking all the data and information into consideration, we
integrate them into a computer simulation model, which allows us to
quantitatively assess the impact of the hole dimensions and effect of
sampling plans.
Fuel Sleeve Hole Diameter Inspection Plan
Computer Simulation Model
I
ESTIMATE OR ASSUME
HOLE DIM. RANDOM
VARIABLE PARAMETERS
PICK UP NEXT SLEEVE
GENERATE HOLE DIM.
RANDOM SAMPLE
USE THE SAMPLING PLAN
TO SCREEN EACH SLEEVE
THE SLEEVE PASSES THE SAMPLING INSPECTION?
,, YES
ACCUMULATE THE GOOD SLEEVE
NO
-f 264 SLE. YET (FPB)? OR 120 SLE. YET (OPB)? 1
SLEEVE • YES
USE AEROTHERMO MODEL TO
ACCESS THE FLOW PROPERTIES
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Proposed Sampling Plan
1. Inspect 5 holes among 24 of each row, total 35 holes on every
sleeve.
2. If one or more inspected hole diameters are out-of-print,
reject that sleeve.
3. If two or more sleeves are rejected, stop manufacturing and
initiate corrective actions.
The Simulation Result
Table 2 summarizes the simulation result. It reveals that for a
manufacturing process capability with mean .0185" and standard
deviation .0001", the sleeves which pass the proposed inspection
provide adequate engine flow property as follows: Sub-system 1
temperature change within 3.4R compared with the requirement +/-6.5R;
Sub-system 2 temperature change within 3.54R versus the requirement
+/-8.5R; and Sub-system 3 flow rate change within -.01 lb/second
versus the requirement +/-.02 Ib/sec.. It also shows that when the
manufacturing process degrades, the sampling plan will detect the
trend and reject the parts very easily, therefor triggering actions
to correct manufacturing problems. For example, for a manufacturing
capability with mean .0185" and standard deviation .0003", the
sampling plan rejects 83% of the submitted sleeves. Overall
evaluation of engineering analysis and simulation result suggests
that a relaxation of the drawing tolerance from .018"+.002/-.000 to
.018"+/-.002 is reasonable and will further reduce manufacturing
cost.
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Table 2; Sleeve Hole Inspection Simulation Result
"X. holei^*s-d
dia.mean ^^
.0183"
.0185"
Sub-Sys 1
Temp. Delta
Sub-Sys 2
Temp. Delta
Sub-Sys 3
flow rate Delta
Sub-Sys 1
Temp. Delta
Sub-Sys 2
Temp. Delta
Sub-Sys 3
flow rate Delta
.0001"
iimu ave
1.94
-2.01
-.01
3.24
-3.36
-.01
simu ma)
2.10
-2.19
-.01
3.40
-3.54
-.01
sleeve
rei.rate
6%
6%
6%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
.0002"
simu ave
1.96
-1.99
-.01
3.24
-3.35
-.01
simu max
2.21
-2.35
-.01
3.55
-3.71
-.01
sleeve
re j. rate
93%
93%
93%
22%
22%
22%
.0003"
simu ave
1.83
-1.67
-.01
3.27
-3.33
-.01
simu max
1.83
-1.67
-.01
3.65
-3.87
-.01
sleeve
re|.rate
99.9%
99.9%
99.9%
83%
83%
83%
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